The Rise of Fascism
The end of World War I left Europe in shambles. Almost an entire generation of young men were either killed or disabled by the war, and the economy, which was just beginning to recover, suffered another hit during the global depression of the 1930s. Comparatively speaking, the United States fared much better than most countries because of profits from manufacturing and arms sales during the war and, in terms of casualties, because of the fact that we entered the war much later. There was, however, a general consensus in the country that World War I had not been our fight to begin with. Wilson’s failure, following the war, to convince the Senate to ratify the Treaty of Versailles, which included U.S. participation in the League of Nations, was indicative of the strong isolationist sentiment that swept through the nation, as was the U.S.-led Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928.
The Great Depression prompted several international efforts at global cooperation, including the London Economic Discussion in 1933, but the United States did not play a major role (Smith 2007, 340). The key obstacle to international economic cooperation was that steps that might have helped the worldwide economy posed a significant risk of worsening the situation in specific countries, including the United States, and it was difficult to get any nation to make sacrifices for overall economic health when the situation within its own borders was already dire. Several treaties during the 1930s focused on promoting free trade and lowering tariffs. Although they were of limited short-term value, given the global economic problems, they did form a basis for the economic system that would emerge after World War II.
In general, the United States focused closer to home during the 1930s, with a renewed effort to improve relations with Latin America. The general trend toward better relations with Latin America that had been launched under Hoover was expanded during Roosevelt’s tenure as the Good Neighbor Policy. Latin American foreign policy since the Spanish American War had been handled largely by U.S. military interventions, so our neighbors to the south regarded the new policy as a welcome change.
The United States made a concerted effort to ignore the troubles brewing in Europe, but they were hard to avoid. The weakened state in many countries gave rise to extremist politics. Benito Mussolini, who rose to power in Italy during the 1920s with a message of Fascism, invaded Ethiopia in 1935. The League of Nations protested, but did nothing, and other European leaders with nationalist aims took note of the league’s inaction (Maddox 1992, 42).
Adolf Hitler was appointed Chancellor of Germany in 1933 and quickly dismantled Germany’s democratic system. He launched ambitious programs designed to revive the German economy, which had been saddled with a significant war debt at the conclusion of World War I. His programs included massive road projects and government funding for the manufacture of a “people’s car”—or Volkswagen. Hitler was adamantly anticommunist, so U.S. leaders were not especially concerned with his internal policies in the early 1930s (Payne 1996, 187–92). (Click on the thumbnail NEWSREELS: Fascism.)
In 1936, however, Hitler and Mussolini (who were now allied as the Axis Powers) came to the aid of General Francisco Franco, who was attempting to overthrow the democratic government of Spain. The Spanish government received assistance from the Soviet Union and an assortment of volunteers from around the world, but other democratic governments refused to become involved. The primary response from the United States was a series of Neutrality Acts, which reaffirmed its intent to remain strictly impartial in all European conflicts. The war finally ended in 1939, after three years of battle and heavy military and civilian casualties, with General Franco as the victor (Payne 1996, 238-9).
In addition to aiding Franco, German troops were on the march throughout Europe. In 1938, Hitler invaded Austria and, as a result of an agreement with Britain and France at the Munich Discussion later that year, also took control of the German-speaking areas of Czechoslovakia. Instead of appeasing Hitler, as Britain and France had hoped, the agreement simply whetted his appetite. In 1939, Germany signed a nonaggression pact with the Soviet Union, despite Hitler’s long-stated opposition to Communism. In September of that year, German troops invaded Poland (Payne 1996, 361). Aware that they could no longer remain outside the conflict, Britain and France declared war on Germany. By the end of 1940, France had fallen, and Axis troops controlled all of Europe, with the sole exception of Great Britain.
Although officially neutral, the United States began a naval buildup in 1938. With Britain under fire, Roosevelt ordered the first peacetime draft in U.S. history and took the first steps toward war when he authorized sending the British several dozen old battleships in exchange for the rights to several defense posts in the Atlantic. He took this action without congressional approval, in a move bitterly opposed by isolationist groups. The America First movement, led by Charles Lindbergh, opposed any sort of assistance that might pull the United States into the conflict (Schlesinger 2003, 452–3). This position was initially popular with the American public, but the mood shifted toward giving all possible assistance to the Allies, short of sending troops, as it grew increasingly likely that Axis forces would defeat the British. (Click on the thumbnail NEWSREELS: America First | Multimedia transcript.)
Public opinion turned even more sharply against the Nazis when word broke, in the autumn of 1938, that the Nazi SS—secret police—had escalated attacks against German Jews, destroying homes, businesses, and synagogues in the infamous “night of broken glass” (Kristallnacht). Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes went on record, calling Hitler a “brutal dictator,” and the American ambassador to Germany was officially recalled (Rosen 2006, 76–7).
In 1941, Roosevelt—newly elected to an unprecedented third term—convinced Congress by a narrow margin to approve the Lend-Lease Bill, which essentially loaned Britain the supplies and military hardware that it could no longer afford to purchase. Later that year, in response to Hitler’s decision to invade the Soviet Union, British leader Winston Churchill met with FDR on a battleship off the coast of Canada and drafted the Atlantic Charter, opposing dictatorial rule and reaffirming the right of citizens to choose their form of government. The Soviet Union signed the charter later that year. The United States was still officially neutral but was nevertheless taking early steps to direct the war effort in all ways short of sending in troops (Rosen 2006, 151–52).
II. Pearl Harbor
Trouble was brewing in the Pacific, as well. In 1934, the United States passed a law that followed through on its promise, given at the conclusion of the Spanish-American War, to eventually grant independence to the Philippines. The provisions of the agreement stated that the United States would pull out of the islands in 1946. Whereas the United States viewed this as promotion of democracy, Japan saw the act as an indication that the United States had little interest in the region. Japan was already beginning to flex its military muscles in the Pacific, and in 1937, invaded China.
In 1940, Japan officially joined with Germany and Italy, as part of the Axis Powers. In response to that alliance, the United States refused to supply Japan with industrial and military equipment. Japan depended heavily on the United States for scrap iron, gas, and other supplies but would not agree to the U.S. condition that it pull its troops out of China. Japan officially continued with negotiations but quietly prepared for an attack on U.S. military installations in the Pacific (Nalty 1999, 29–30).
On December 7, 1941, Japan launched an aerial attack against the U.S. base at Pearl Harbor in Hawaii, killing or wounding 3,478 Americans. Two battleships, the Arizona and the Oklahoma, were completely destroyed, and six others took heavy damage. The attack was a serious blow to American naval power, but fortunately for the United States, its three largest aircraft carriers were not docked at that time (ibid). In less than a week, Congress approved a formal declaration of war against Japan, with only one vote against. That vote was cast by Montana representative, Jeanette Rankin, a lifelong pacifist who had also voted against World War I. Rankin noted that she, as a woman, could not be sent to war, and she therefore refused to send anyone else (Cott 1993, 298). Within days, Germany and Italy declared war on the United States, in accordance with the terms of their alliance with Japan. (Click on the thumbnail NEWSREELS: Pearl Harbor.)
Although the American public was in favor of going after Japan first, it was clear that the situation in Europe demanded immediate attention. Without U.S. aid, Britain and the Soviet Union were in very real danger of defeat, and once the Axis Powers were finished subjugating Europe, they would have shifted their military support to oppose the United States in the Pacific. The bulk of U.S. forces were, therefore, focused on helping the Allies defeat Germany, initially in North Africa. (Click on the thumbnail NEWSREELS: Over There…Again.)
The Russians were, however, taking the brunt of the German offensive, which was a major point of contention between the Allies. The Soviet Union lost nearly twenty-seven million people during the war, and the Russian leader, Joseph Stalin, complained that the United States and Great Britain were willing to fight until the last Russian was dead. Nature was Russia’s strongest ally, as an unusually harsh winter in 1942 wiped out thousands of German troops who were not equipped for the bitter cold, because of Hitler’s belief that Russia would be defeated before winter arrived. This break turned the tide and allowed Soviet troops to begin to slowly push the Germans back toward Berlin (Jones 2001, 193–5).
Finally, on June 6, 1944 (D-Day, short for disembarkation day), over 160,000 allied troops landed at Normandy. Both France and Italy were liberated during the summer. The Germans launched a major counteroffensive—the Battle of the Bulge—in December and also began aerial bombardment of London, but these were clearly last-ditch efforts. Before spring was over, Hitler committed suicide, and Germany surrendered (Wagner et al. 2007, 602).
As Allied troops occupied Germany, the full extent of Hitler’s atrocities was brought to light. His government had murdered nearly 11 million people. Just over half were Jews, both in Germany and in the areas that German troops had occupied during the war. The other five million were an assortment of gypsies, handicapped children, Catholics, Jehovah’s Witnesses, and political opponents (Bergen 2002, 191–3). (Click on the thumbnail NEWSREELS: Uncovering the Holocaust.)
On the Pacific front, the Japanese made major gains early in the war, forcing General Douglas MacArthur’s troops to abandon the Philippine Islands. Although the tide began to shift during the summer of 1942, with the Japanese defeat at the Battle of Midway, there was much territory to regain (Nalty 1999, 15–16). (Click on the thumbnail NEWSREELS: The Pacific Front.)
Naval battles resulted in significant losses for the American forces, but U.S. industry was rapidly providing replacement ships and planes. Japan’s industrial capacity was far more limited. In June of 1944, a major aerial battle in the Marianas Islands destroyed hundreds of Japanese planes that could not be easily replaced. A similar battle at Leyte Gulf resulted in irreversible damages to the Japanese fleet (Nalty 1999, 17).
Ground warfare, however, raged on. General Douglas MacArthur was able to make good on his promise, “I shall return,” in October of 1944, as U.S. troops began a costly, but ultimately successful, campaign to retake the Philippines. In March of 1945, American troops stormed Iwo Jima, raising the flag on Mount Suribachi, at the end of a battle that resulted in nearly 7,000 U.S. casualties and over 22,000 Japanese casualties (Maddox 1992, 294). Aerial bombardment of Tokyo began that month as well, leaving an estimated 85,000 dead (Sherry 1995, 113).
III. The Home Front
During the months prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor, President Roosevelt had argued before Congress that even though the United States did not wish to send troops into battle, the country could still play a pivotal role. As the “arsenal of democracy”—the economic engine providing military equipment and supplies to the European troops that were fighting the Axis powers—we could determine the outcome of the war (Rosen 2006, 152). The attack on Pearl Harbor ensured that the United States would also take a more direct role in the fighting, but the economic and manufacturing strength of the country was a critical component in the eventual Allied victory.
As the only major industrial nation that was not being bombed, the United States had a definite advantage. By 1944, the United States alone was manufacturing twice as much military equipment as Germany and Japan combined. By the end of the war, U.S. manufacturers had produced over 90,000 tanks, 100,000 ships, and nearly 300,000 military aircraft (Graebner 1979, 36). This production had the added benefit of boosting the U.S. economy, erasing the last signs of the Great Depression.
Management and labor generally cooperated during the war, largely because the National War Labor Board, formed near the beginning of the war, intervened to prevent major conflicts. Salaries nearly doubled during the course of the war, and price controls meant that purchasing power increased significantly. Workers were, however, encouraged to purchase war bonds as a way of both promoting the war effort and saving for the future. Taxes were also increased across the board (Wagner et al. 2007, 853–4).
Rationing and the limited availability of consumer products also meant that there was less to purchase with the money on hand. Automotive factories had converted to tank and aircraft production, so there were no new vehicles available for purchase. Gas was rationed, so it was difficult to travel very far anyway. With the supply of silk that had traditionally been used for women’s stockings cut off at the beginning of the war, the newly invented nylon had been substituted. Nylon was now needed for military parachutes, however, so women resorted to “bottled stockings,” applying makeup to their legs and painting seams on the back with an eyebrow pencil to give the appearance of stockings (Perrett 1985, 395).
Children grew “victory gardens” to help provide the family with food and diligently recycled aluminum and other materials. Although the recycling and conservation efforts probably had a negligible effect on overall war production, they helped to give even the youngest citizens the sense that they, too, were doing something to further the cause (Heidler and Heidler 2007, 72). Hollywood stars joined the effort as well. In 1944, Life magazine photographed actress Elyse Knox in the wedding gown that included portions of the silk parachute that had saved the life of her fiancé, football star Tom Harmon (Fitzgerald and Magers 2002, 124).
Hollywood was on board in other ways, as well. Earlier uses of motion pictures to promote World War I had been fairly heavy-handed because of the need to convince a reluctant public that there was a strong reason for U.S. participation. In World War II, the direct attack on the nation meant that filmmakers could focus on the threat to the United States, which was a much easier sell.
Many of the films produced by Hollywood, such as the motivational film series Why We Fight, by Frank Capra, were commissioned by the U.S. government. Merrie Melodies created a cartoon character “Private Snafu,” to help train the troops (Rollins 1998, 110–11). Other companies, including Walt Disney, used their popular cartoon characters, such as Donald Duck, to poke fun at the enemy. Many of the films promoting the war effort spoke out against Axis propaganda but also used propaganda techniques, including racial stereotypes of the enemy, in their message. (Click on the thumbnail NEWSREELS: Hollywood Goes to War.)
This type of propaganda fueled the strong anti-Japanese sentiment that was already having a major impact on the many Japanese-Americans in the country. Although approximately two-thirds of those of Japanese ancestry in the United States had been born here and were American citizens, all were considered suspect. Under pressure from military and political leaders in California, which had the largest Japanese population in the country, President Roosevelt issued an executive order in early 1942 that allowed the army to sequester all Japanese-Americans in internment camps run by the War Relocation Authority (Wagner et al. 2007, 207).
Over 100,000 people were moved to the camps. Having been forced to sell their homes and businesses immediately, they received far less than market value, and most of these families lost their life savings as a result of the relocation. Some challenged the legality of the internment, which was upheld by the Supreme Court in 1944, in Korematsu v. United States, but another ruling later in the year suggested that this decision did not apply to “loyal” U.S. citizens. By 1945, most had been released (Maddox 1992, 198–9). In 1988, Congress finally offered compensation of $20,000 to those who had been interned, but the award was only for the individuals, not their descendants, and many of those who had been affected by the relocation had died in the interim (U.S. Congress 1988). (Click on the thumbnail NEWSREELS: Japanese Internment.)
With so many men fighting in Europe and the Pacific, a new source of factory workers was needed. Women poured into factory jobs that had previously been reserved for men only, and Rosie the Riveter became a national symbol for women’s “can-do” attitude toward the war. Six million women joined the paid workforce during the war, and many others turned their homes into child care centers to watch the children of factory workers. (Click on the thumbnail NEWSREELS: Rosie the Riveter.) These women were motivated both by a patriotic desire to contribute to the war effort and simple economic reality. Families needed the money because the wages a soldier earned were generally less than he brought home before the war (Mintz and Kellogg 1989, 161–2). Women were also recruited into the military. Serving as WACs (Women’s Army Corps, previously Women’s Auxiliary Army Corps) and WAVES (Women Accepted for Voluntary Emergency Service), they filled nearly 350,000 noncombat positions during the war (Felder 2003, 172).
The war also opened doors of opportunity for minorities, nearly one million of whom served in the war. African Americans were segregated into their own units, and most were assigned to support units, although several combat units, including the famed Tuskegee Airmen, fought with distinction in key battles in the war. Native Americans and Mexican-Americans who fought were integrated into the regular forces. Several years after the end of the war, in 1948, the military would become the first major American institution to be officially desegregated.
During the war, President Roosevelt pushed for an end to discrimination in war-production jobs, and many African-Americans migrated to the North to take advantage of these few jobs where they could earn equal pay. Membership in the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) grew dramatically during the war years, and the Congress of Racial Equality, which was formed just before the attack on Pearl Harbor, promoted the “double V,” symbol—victory not only against the Axis Powers, but against the racism they faced at home.
Research and development also played a significant role in the Allied victory. Synthetic materials and new weapons were created during the war and advances in radar and sonar helped to locate and destroy enemy targets. IBM tabulating and punch-card machines were used in code breaking, and the ability to crack enemy codes was one of the most powerful advantages of the Allies (Budiansky 2000, 280).
The most significant technological advancement, however, was the creation of the atomic bomb. German scientists were early pioneers, and several internationally known physicists, including Niels Bohr and Albert Einstein, met with President Roosevelt to convince him of the need to develop the weapon before Hitler could do so. The effort was code-named the Manhattan Project, and Congress appropriated over two billion dollars for atomic research and development during the war (Morton 2003, 173). (Click on the thumbnail NEWSREELS: The Manhattan Project.)
IV. Victory for the Allies
President Roosevelt did not live to see the end of the war because he died in office in early April of 1945. Preparations for concluding the war, however, had begun in late 1943. After a meeting in Cairo with Chiang Kai-shek, the Chinese leader, at which Churchill and Roosevelt signed the Cairo Declaration, the “Big Three” Allied leaders—Roosevelt, Winston Churchill, and Josef Stalin—met in Tehran, Iran. FDR avoided meeting separately with Churchill at the meeting, in order to reassure Stalin that they were not discussing “side deals” that might not be in the best interest of the Soviet Union. The three leaders discussed the second front that Russia had been requesting for more than a year and determined the timing and location for the invasion, code-named Operation Overlord. Stalin also pledged to join the Allied fight in the Pacific once Germany was defeated, although there was considerable disagreement about how Germany’s borders would be redrawn at the end of the war. The leaders decided to table that issue for discussion at a later time (Tuchman 2001, 406–8).
The next major negotiations were held in August 1944 at Dumbarton Oaks, in the Georgetown area of Washington, D.C. Representatives of the United States, China, the Soviet Union, and Great Britain spent six weeks sketching out the details for the creation of a postwar collective-security organization. The basic plan for the United Nations, including the General Assembly, the Secretariat, and the basic composition of the Security Council and its five permanent members (the United States, the United Kingdom, France, the Soviet Union, and China) were all determined at this meeting. The question of postwar political borders, however, was still a subject of disagreement, and it was again postponed (Maddox 1992, 321–2).
The Dumbarton Oaks Discussion also laid the groundwork for the next meeting of the “Big Three” at Yalta, in February of 1945. Although the team working on the Manhattan Project was cautiously optimistic about progress on the atomic bomb, the weapon was still untested, and Roosevelt’s key concern at the Yalta Discussion was ensuring that Stalin agreed to commit Soviet troops to the Pacific front once Hitler was defeated. (Click on the thumbnail NEWSREELS: Yalta Discussion.)
When Roosevelt was elected to a fourth term in 1944, it was widely expected that he would not live until the end of that term. Many Democratic leaders believed that Roosevelt’s vice president during the previous term, Henry A. Wallace, leaned too far to the left and did not want to see him assume the presidency in the increasingly likely event of FDR’s death. Harry S. Truman, a two-term senator from Missouri, was selected as a compromise that would be acceptable to all parties, even though he was initially reluctant to take the job (Perrett 1985, 291–2).
His reluctance was understandable. Truman had served as vice president for less than three months when Roosevelt died on April 12, 1945. He found himself suddenly in charge of the war, which fortunately was winding down in Europe, but still in full swing in the Pacific. Germany surrendered in early May, but many believed that the war with Japan could stretch out for several more years. Roosevelt died just days before the scheduled conference to create the United Nations. Truman was determined that Roosevelt’s proposal for the United Nations would not meet the same fate as Wilson’s League of Nations. He spoke frequently in support of the organization, which he viewed as a “solid structure upon which we can build a better world” (U.S. Department of State 2005). The UN Charter was signed in San Francisco on June 26, 1945 and was ratified by the U.S. Senate just over a month later, with only two votes against (ibid).
In mid-July, Truman met with Churchill and Stalin at Potsdam, Germany, and was informed on the first day of the meetings that atomic testing at the Trinity site in the mountains of New Mexico was a success. He mentioned the weapon in rather vague terms to Stalin, and noted Stalin agreed that any weapon that could quickly end the war with Japan should be used. At the conclusion of the conference, Truman, Churchill, and Chiang Kai-shek signed the Potsdam Declaration. Stalin was not included, because he was not yet a participant in the war in the Pacific. Japanese cities were showered with leaflets demanding unconditional surrender, but the military leadership did not respond (Morton 2003, 170).
Convinced that the Japanese were not going to meet the terms of unconditional surrender, Truman gave the order to proceed with the bombing at any point after August 3, 1945. On August 6, an atomic bomb nicknamed “Little Boy” was dropped on the Japanese city of Hiroshima, killing about 80,000 people and reducing the city—Japan’s eighth largest—to rubble. Within the next day, the Soviet Union declared war on Japan and sent troops across the border into Manchuria. On August 9, the United States dropped a second bomb on the secondary target of Nagasaki, having failed to make its run over the primary target, which was the island of Kokura (Morton 2003, 176–7). The next day, the Japanese government agreed to Allied terms for surrender. (Click on the thumbnail NEWSREELS: Hiroshima & Nagasaki.)
Historians still debate whether Truman’s primary motivation for use of atomic weapons was to defeat the Japanese or to send a strong message to the Soviet Union. Primary sources suggest, however, that concerns about the growing power of the Soviet Union played a decidedly secondary role to Truman’s concern about the casualties that could occur if the war dragged on (Morton 2003, 170). Intelligence sources available to Truman indicated that Japan had as many as two million troops on the home islands, and the casualty estimates he received stated that as many as one million deaths, including several hundred thousand Allied soldiers, could be expected if a ground war was initiated (Morton 2003, 160). Although Truman noted that he never lost any sleep over the decision, it is clear that he realized the impact of the decision and that the use of nuclear weapons had ushered in a new era of warfare (Gaddis 2000, 53).
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