This essay examines an overlooked element of the precautionary principle: a prudent assessment of the long-range or remote catastrophes possibly associated with technological development must include the catastrophes that may take place because of the absence of such technologies. In short, this brief essay attempts to turn the precautionary principle on its head by arguing that, (1) if the long-term survival of any life form is precarious, and if the survival of the current human population is particularly precarious, especially given contemporary urban population densities, and (2) if technological innovation and progress are necessary in order rapidly to adapt humans to meet environmental threats that would otherwise be catastrophic on a large scale (e.g., pandemics of highly lethal diseases), then (3) the development of biomedical technologies in many forms, but in particular including human germ-line genetic engineering, may be required by the precautionary principle, given the prospect of the obliteration of humans in the absence of such enhanced biotechnology. The precautionary principle thus properly understood requires an ethos that should generally support technological innovation, at least in particular areas of biotechnology.

Keywords: precautionary principle, public health, risk assessment, technological development

I. PRUDENT RISK-TAKING

The so-called precautionary principle raises a cluster of questions about how

prudently to engage in risk-taking. All human activities involve risks. The

development of new technologies is no exception. However, given a not-

implausible account of the human situation, the unavailability of at least some

biomedical technologies may itself count as a risk to continued human

survival. This essay will examine an overlooked element of the precautionary

Address correspondence to: H. Tristram Engelhardt, Jr., Ph.D., M.D., Department of Philosophy, MS 14, Rice University, Houston, TX 77005, USA. E-mail: [email protected]

10.1080/03605310490500518$16.00 # Taylor & Francis Ltd.

principle: a prudent assessment of the long-range or remote catastrophes

possibly associated with technological development must include the

catastrophes that may take place because of the absence of such technologies.

In short, this brief essay will attempt to turn the precautionary principle on its

head by arguing that, (1) if the long-term survival of any life form is

precarious, and if the survival of the current human population is particularly

precarious, especially given contemporary urban population densities, and (2)

if technological innovation and progress are necessary in order rapidly to

adapt humans to meet environmental threats that would otherwise be

catastrophic on a large scale (e.g., pandemics of highly lethal diseases), then

(3) the development of biomedical technologies in many forms (some, such as

human reproductive cloning or embryo research may be prohibited on moral

grounds [Engelhardt, 2000]), but in particular including human germ-line

genetic engineering, may be required by the precautionary principle, given the

prospect of the obliteration of humans in the absence of such enhanced

biotechnology. The precautionary principle thus properly understood requires

an ethos that should generally support technological innovation, at least in

particular areas of biotechnology.

II. PUTTING THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE

IN CONTEXT

There are a number of difficulties in making prudent assessments of risk. To

begin with, intuitions vary widely about how to compare risks appropriately.

There are some who regard a one-hour commercial flight with greater

apprehension than a four-hour automobile journey to the same city. This is the

case even though in general the risks are greater from the latter than the

former. In part, this perception is grounded in the difference in psycho-social

impact of learning about the death of 200 passengers in an airline crash versus

learning of 200 automobile accidents in a year’s time, each involving one

fatality. The same number of people dying or being disabled at the same time

usually has a more dramatic psycho-social impact than the same number being

disabled or dying over a more extended period of time. So, too, were it the

case that the number of individuals likely to be disabled or killed by nuclear

power plant accidents were no greater than the number of persons likely to be

disabled or killed by the generation of the same amount of electric power from

the use of fossil fuels, the socially disruptive character of all of the deaths

302 H. TRISTRAM ENGELHARDT, JR., & FABRICE JOTTERAND

happening at once appears to give this mass tragedy a weight greater than the

sum of all the individual tragedies.1 Intuitions that favor giving greater weight

to concerns regarding airplane crashes and nuclear power plant accidents may

contribute to the intuitions that are invoked to support the precautionary

principle.2

In this essay, the precautionary principle is understood as the rule that one

should never engage in a technological development or application unless it

can be shown that this will not lead to large-scale disasters or catastrophes.3

The possibility of a large-scale disaster or catastrophe is regarded as sufficient

to prohibit the application of new technologies that offer considerable benefit

to humans. In this sense, the precautionary principle is a variation of a prin-

ciple of risk-aversiveness, so that one takes maximal regard of possible large-

scale or catastrophic disasters, however remote and despite the benefits that

might accrue from the technology. This understanding of the precautionary

principle would constrain one to accept the likelihood of a number of deaths in

order to avoid the remote possibility of even greater catastrophes.

For example, the precautionary principle has been invoked to prohibit the

introduction of genetically modified organisms, until one can with a very high

degree of certainty rule out the possibility of catastrophic outcomes. Those

who embrace the precautionary principle would accept the starvation of

millions in third-world countries who could be fed by genetically modified

grains, rather than assume a very remote and very unlikely interruption of the

ecological balance as a result of unexpected or unforeseen genetic effects as a

result of genetically modified organisms.

Although the availability of genetically modified foodstuffs might aid the

starving, this very important good would be seen to be outweighed by a

possible, albeit unlikely, ecological catastrophe. New technologies are thus

held to be guilty until proven innocent (Saunders, 2000). Marc Moreno who

reports that according to a panel of food policy experts, the ban – on the basis

of the precautionary principle – of genetically modified food (GM) has no

scientific ground and causes starvation in the developing world (Moreno,

2002). In this vein, Goklany acknowledges that in order to meet food demands

additional deforestation of millions of hectares will be required. In 1997,

according to the Food and Agricultural Organization, it was estimated that

already 1,510 million hectares were devoted to cropland and by 2050 an

additional 1,600 million hectares of habitat land would be lost (FAO, 2000).

He also notes that an annual increase of productivity of 2% (through the use of

generically modified crops) would be translated into at least 422 million

THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE: A DIALECTICAL RECONSIDERATION 303

hectares of cropland currently under plow that could be returned to nature or

made available for habitat or other human uses, thus increasing environmental

benefits (Goklany, 2001, pp. 30–32). He therefore concludes that, considering

that the benefits related to the use of genetically modified crops outweigh the

risks, biotechnology in agriculture can provide a means for addressing the

problem of malnutrition around the globe without necessarily neglecting

the environment. As he points out ‘‘the rewards of GM crops greatly outweigh

their risks. Although it would be a mistake to go full steam ahead on GM

crops, it would be a bigger mistake to stop them in their tracks. The wisest

policy would be to go as fast as possible while keeping a sharp lookout, and

staying on the track to improvements in human and environmental well-

being’’ (Goklany, 2001, p. 56).4 To proceed in this fashion would require

reconsidering the implications of the precautionary principle as usually

interpreted in order to take into account the potential damaging consequences

of not promoting scientific and technological development.

Because of the difficulty of proving that new technologies will not involve

unanticipated catastrophic outcomes, the precautionary principle if interpreted

strictly, as shown from the example of policy responses regarding food from

genetically modified crops, would seem to place an unjustifiable burden on all

technological progress. It would not only appear to forbid anything but the most

gradual introduction of most new technologies, but also give equal grounds for

the suspension of technological interventions for which there has not been ample

time to assess unforeseen risks.5 For instance, one might hypothesize that a wide

range of current pharmaceutical agents may carry with them unforeseen

consequences for the development of senile dementia, etc. With a sufficiently

active imagination one could bring much of contemporary biotechnology under

suspicion without a ready ability to lift the cloud of uncertainty.

The concern to give proper weight to possible catastrophic outcomes is

further augmented by discounting particular benefits, especially possible eco-

nomic benefits. Among many of the proponents of the precautionary principles,

there is a view either that it is improper to give any weight to economic benefits

or that the importance of such benefits has been improperly inflated. Nancy

Myers, for instance, claims that the World Trade Organization and the North

American Free Trade Agreement ‘‘institutionalized . . . the ascendancy of commerce over environmental and public health concerns’’ and hence cost-

benefit assessments, it is argued, dictate that products or technological

innovations outweigh the costs of possible environmental harms (Myers,

2002, p. 214). If all consideration of economic benefits were removed from

304 H. TRISTRAM ENGELHARDT, JR., & FABRICE JOTTERAND

cost-benefit calculations, a considerable burden would have been placed on the

development of promising new technologies. This criticism of the weight to be

given to economic benefits opens the larger issue of how to compare different

genre of benefits and harms.

Finally, one must note that the precautionary principle is often interpreted

so as to give equal if not greater weight to concerns with the environment in

and of itself, not simply as harms to the environment may have indirect

impacts on human welfare. Here the question is not simply of comparing

benefits and harms, but the question of whose harms and benefits should be

compared and in what way. That is, how is one to compare the possibility of

harm to animals, ecosystems, and the environment with the possibility of

harms and benefits to humans? This weighting of the environment, especially

ecosystems in and of themselves, is noted by Alston Chase who asserts that the

precautionary principle reflects concerns regarding benefits and harms that

are biocentric6 rather than humanistic or human-centered. As he puts it,

‘‘biocentrism is the fundamental value conveyed in most treaties or protocols

promoting the Precautionary Principle’’ (Chase, 1997, p. 5). In these terms

one can justify the starvation of millions of people for the sake of the well-

being of the ecosystem.

The assessment of risks to the environment requires an account of how to

compare harms and benefits to humans as well as to other living organisms and

the environment generally. Such comparisons would require a complex

account differentiating diverse benefits and harms as these have impact on

humans, animals, ecosystems, and the environment in itself. Such rankings of

goods and harms fall beyond a factual description of the consequences of

particular technological interventions. It requires choosing one among a

number of competing moral visions. This circumstance is stressed by Joe

Thornton in his assessment of policies pertaining to environmental and health

issues. He notes the obvious: the assessment of risk presupposes endorsing a

particular vision that ranks harms and benefits with respect to interests in

human versus environmental flourishing. In his volume, Pandora’s Poison:

Chlorine, Health, and a New Environment Strategy, he notes that ‘‘I do not

claim balance or objectivity, because these are neither appropriate nor possible

in this kind of effort’’ (Thornton, 2000, p. ix). Thornton recognizes the

complex constitution of controversies involving a heavy political and moral

overlay. To sort out such controversies, one needs to look with care at the

geography of the different influences, as well as endorse a particular approach

to weighting harms and benefits (Engelhardt & Caplan, 1987).

THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE: A DIALECTICAL RECONSIDERATION 305

However one sorts out the proper assessment of harms and benefits, the

cultural force of the precautionary principle would seem to place the burden of

suspicion on technological innovation and progress, in that all innovative

technological interventions carry with them an unassessable prospect of an

unanticipated, large-scale, catastrophic side effect.7 This conclusion would

seem to follow, given intuitions that give a greater weight to possible significant

catastrophic outcomes over equal but less catastrophic costs in human lives and

suffering. This conclusion is further fortified by discounting economic benefits

and adding a biocentric accent to the calculation of benefits and harms. All of

this seems to lead to regarding the precautionary principle as hostile to

biotechnological progress. This conclusion will now be brought into question.

III. THE NEED FOR RAPID RE-ADAPTATION OF HUMANS

TO AN EVER-CHANGING AND OFTEN

THREATENING ENVIRONMENT

Without addressing the issue of how to compare harms and benefits, one can

bring into question the putative conclusion that the precautionary principle

will under all circumstances place a burden against technological progress.

The arguments developed below show that the precautionary principle, if

properly understood, should support at least certain areas of biotechnological

innovation, rather than constitute an impediment. In what follows, the focus is

given to human welfare. With a few changes, the focus could be brought to

bear on ecosystems as well. As developed, the argument does take into

account concerns with the ecosystems insofar as they would constitute a threat

to the long-range survival of the human species.

The long-range survival of humans depends on the capacity of humans to

withstand threats from an environment often significantly hostile to the

survival of humans, indeed, to the long-range survival of any species of

organisms. Among those threatening elements are new viruses, new variations

of old viruses, and bacteria that have become altered so as to be drug-resistant

and/or toxic to humans in new ways. Similar threats to human survival can be

envisaged in terms of viruses and other life forms that might threaten the

human food supply and the environment. Given the network of rapid global

travel, quarantine over any significant period of time is likely to be ineffective

without a near total paralysis of international trade (see for instance the

analysis of Bailey (2002) in relation to plant biotechnology). From Ebola and

306 H. TRISTRAM ENGELHARDT, JR., & FABRICE JOTTERAND

AIDS to new forms of influenza and SARS, recent history has provided

numerous possibilities for environmental confrontations that could lead to

large-scale, indeed catastrophic, loss of human life.

The protean possibilities for future threats of a large-scale, indeed

catastrophic magnitude, given a reasonable interpretation of the precautionary

principle, would require the vigorous development of a biotechnology suf-

ficient to produce not simply new antimicrobials and new vaccines, but able

genetically to modify humans as well as the organisms that serve as foodstuffs

for humans. Given the prospect of a catastrophic development of a hyper-

virulent microbe threatening either humans or their foodstuffs, the human

ability both to kill such threatening microbes as well as rapidly to readapt

humans and their foodstuffs to resist such threats would be obligatory under

the precautionary principle. The precautionary principle should require

vigorously supporting technological and scientific progress.8

This result is an important acknowledgement. There are two sides or

dimensions of the precautionary principle. On the one hand, the precautionary

principle requires considering the untoward consequences of new tech-

nological innovation. On the other hand, the precautionary principle requires

considering the untoward consequences of not supporting technological

innovation. In short, one must not only fear catastrophes that will flow from a

technology, but also the catastrophes that will flow from its absence.

The question then is how to compare the two sides or dimensions of the

precautionary principle. Which set of unforeseen, large-scale, and cata-

strophic consequences should be given greater weight and why? Possible

catastrophes frame technology or frame its absence. To begin with, there are

factual considerations. Given the recorded history of disastrous epidemics

when communication among humans was less global than today, one might

very well have grounds to tilt the balance in favor of giving greater weight to

the unforeseen consequences likely to flow from the failure to accelerate

biotechnological progress and encourage biotechnological innovation. Should

such reflections on the history of the hostility of environments to organisms in

general and to humans in particular be credible, then there would be a strong

moral argument grounded in the precautionary principle in favor of sustaining

a bias in favor of biotechnological progress and innovation. In this

circumstance, the precautionary principle would need to be reinterpreted in

order to be understood as substantively technology-friendly.

The greater the plausibility of bioenvironmental threats, the greater the

obligation will be to encourage the development of an appreciation of

THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE: A DIALECTICAL RECONSIDERATION 307

biomedicine and the biomedical technologies as core to the human enterprise.

When the precautionary principle is combined with any moral vision that

gives weight to obligations to future generations, then the biomedical

technologies will be core to the human endeavor of ensuring the survival of the

human species. In short, a more balanced appreciation of the precautionary

principle should transform the principle from being central to an anti-

technological ethos to a principle that when rightly understood is a cardinal

foundation of an ethos supportive of biotechnological innovation. In addition,

insofar as such innovation turns out as a fact of the matter to be enhanced by

larger-than-usual profit-margins in the pharmaceutical and medical device

industries, then one will wish to avoid forms of cost containment, tort liability,

and tax policies that encumber profitability in this industry. In short, a more

balanced consideration of the principle may shed important light on a broader

range of risks associated with biotechnology, namely, those connected with a

failure wholeheartedly to support it.

IV. THE ARGUMENT FROM IGNORANCE

GOES BOTH WAYS

At the very least, this dialectical exploration of the precautionary principle

shows its other side and excluded dimension, thus indicating one of the major

difficulties involved with arguments from ignorance. Evenly applied, the

precautionary principle invites us to give at least as much weight to the

catastrophes we may face from not developing a certain technology as from

developing the technology. Were one of the opinion that the historical record

of devastating epidemics and other environmental changes was not sufficient

to tip the balance vigorously in favor of technological innovation on the basis

of the precautionary principle, then both appeals to ignorance would simply

cancel each other out. In that case, the precautionary principle would be

devoid of force.

It must be acknowledged that this analysis of the precautionary principle

focuses on its application only in areas where it would bear on technologies

whose unavailability could foreseeably lead to catastrophic human harms.

Thus, there may be some (surely not these authors) who might be of the view

that the precautionary principle should preclude the use of cell phones until

the magnetic waves involved had been tested on primates for a sufficiently

long period so as to assess the possibility of long-range adverse outcomes.

308 H. TRISTRAM ENGELHARDT, JR., & FABRICE JOTTERAND

Were the precautionary principle to be employed to block the further use of

cell phones, this concern might not be as easily outweighed by the health risks

from the unavailability of cell phones.

This brief reflection leaves us with two conclusions, at least for some. First,

a balanced appreciation of the precautionary principle leads to any

unanticipated result: rather than setting cautionary blocks to biotechnological

development, the principle should, given a number of plausible empirical

assumptions, encourage biotechnological development. Second, if the factual

assumptions necessary to tip the balance in favor of the precautionary

principle as supporting biotechnological innovation are brought into question,

then the default position will be to deprive the principle of any credible force,

at least in a significant range of biotechnologies. Either the precautionary

principle means something that most have not anticipated (i.e., it is

technology-friendly), or, at least in many areas, it is rendered void by the

possibility of contrary catastrophic possibilities.9

NOTES

1. For a critical appraisal of risk assessment with regard to nuclear power, see MacLean (1987).

2. The precautionary principle has roots in the German Vorsorgeprinzip (‘foresight-planning’), which constitutes, according to Julian Morris, ‘‘a founding principle of German environ- mental policy in the mid-1970s’’ (Morris, 2000, p. 1). Morris, however, points out that in the United States the precautionary principle has implicitly been used since the 1950s, especially by political conservatives groups that opposed the fluoridation of water. The argument was two-fold: first it was argued that fluoride was used as rat poison and second this involuntary mass medication was ‘‘a step on the road to socialism.’’ (Morris, 2000, p. 2). In the 1960’s, the same precautionary principle was implicitly used by left-wing activists to oppose nuclear power. Finally, in the 1970s social scientists referred to the principle in a more general framework. For an overview of the definition and origin of principle see Morris (2000, pp. 1–21).

3. The precautionary principle can be found under many forms in different treaties such as the Montreal Protocol, the Convention on Biological Diversity, the Helsinki Convention on Marine Protection in the Baltic, the Treaty on The Precautionary Principle by the European Union, the Biosafety Protocol and the Treaty on Persistent Organic Pollutants. One of its most influential statements is found in the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development (1992). Principle 15 requires that ‘‘in order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach shall be widely applied by States according to their capabilities. Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation.’’ Avail- able [On-line]: http://sedac.ciesin.org/pidb/texts/rio.declaration.1992.html

THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE: A DIALECTICAL RECONSIDERATION 309

Another influential statement, The Wingspread Statement, which followed a gathering at Wingspread in 1998 (headquarters of the Johnson Foundation in Racine, Wisconsin), likewise presents a strong endorsement of the precautionary principle in public health and environment decision-making. It states ‘‘while we realize that human activities may involve hazards, people must proceed more carefully than has been the case in recent history. Corporations, government entities, organizations, communities, scientists and other individ- uals must adopt a precautionary approach to all human endeavors. Therefore, it is necessary to implement the Precautionary Principle: When an activity raises threats of harm to human health or the environment, precautionary measures should be taken even if some cause and effect relationships are not fully established scientifically. In this context the proponent of an activity, rather than the public, should bear the burden of proof. The process of applying the Precautionary Principle must be open, informed and democratic and must include poten- tially affected parties. It must also involve an examination of the full range of alternatives, including no action.’’ A full version of the Wingspread Statement is available on-line: http:// www.sehn.org/state.html

4. For further details, see Goklany’s chapter on ‘‘The Risks and Rewards of Genetically Modified Crops’’ (2001, pp. 29–56).

5. Risk assessment remains at the core of the discussions surrounding the precautionary principle. Some proponents of the principle, Peter Saunders and Mae-Wan Ho, for instance, argue that it is based on good science and therefore ‘‘a compelling case for the application of the precautionary principle’’ can be made that the precautionary principle can be used to protect the environment and human health (Saunders & Ho, 2003). Interestingly, however, in the first edition of the handbook on the precautionary principle written for the Science and Environmental Health Network, the authors acknowledge that ‘‘risk assessment and other ‘sound science’ approaches to decision-making are highly reliant on policy and scientific assumptions, which are frequently unscientific or subjective’’ (Tickner, Raffensperger, & Myers, p. 14). Chase likewise notes that the precautionary principle is unreliable as ‘‘a means of making quantitative assessments of alternative courses of action’’ and ‘‘does not provide . . . a calculus by which to weigh and compare economic costs against ecologic benefits, or vice versa’’ (Chase, 1997, p. 5).

6. Biocentrism involves ‘‘The belief that . . . the Biosphere or ecosystem takes precedence over the well being of humanity’’ (Chase, 1997, p. 5).

7. A good example of some of the values underlying support for the precautionary principle is found in a document issued in September 2001 by the Canadian government (Government of Canada, 2001). Although the document does not constitute an official position of the govern- ment (it is only a discussion paper), it reflects cultural assumptions concerning technological innovations and progress widespread in Canada. The document raises the question of the need for regulations at the national and international level, and it emphasizes risk management, especially in relation to new technologies (such as biotechnology, for instance). These two concerns characterize public suspicion of technological development while, at the same time, paradoxically, desiring the benefits of new technologies: ‘‘Public opinion surveys show that Canadians want to reap the benefits of change (e.g., biotechnology), but they also want their governments to protect them from the risks. As a result, governments are often called upon to balance new or emerging risks and potential opportunities [technological innovations and progress], and to manage issues where there is significant scientific uncertainty. The decisions they make can have profound effects on societies, trade and economies’’ (Government of Canada, 2001, p. 1). For a general assessment of the document see Lee and Barrett (2002).

310 H. TRISTRAM ENGELHARDT, JR., & FABRICE JOTTERAND

8. Further reflections are needed with respect to the role of risk-taking in scientific progress. This issue goes beyond the scope of this short note. Space exploration illustrates the difficulty in evaluating the exact nature of proper risk assessment. Space exploration may at first blush appear to offer only ‘‘limited’’ benefits in biotechnology at the price of potential dangers for the people involved in it and the rest of the population (the risk of the crash of a space shuttle in inhabited areas is real, as the breaking apart of Columbia as shown). An application of the precautionary principle as usually understood, considering the calculus of risks and benefits, would simply stop any such undertakings.

9. For a critical assessment of the precautionary principle see Morris’ Rethinking Risk and the Precautionary Principle (2000). The contributors to this volume address a variety of issues in relation to precautionary thinking and conclude that the principle has become an arbitrary imposition of regulations that are mostly counterproductive. In other words, the precau- tionary principle appears to be a rhetorical device unable to provide concrete guidance but with untoward consequences. As Chauncey Starr remarks ‘‘the precautionary principle exists only as a rhetorical statement; it provides no useful input to decision making. Expert opinions should be sought, but be recognized as conservatively biased. The search for science-based guidance is commendable, but is rarely achievable’’ (2003, p. 3).

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